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A number of large private equity firms have conducted public
offerings in recent years. Up to this point, these offerings have been
noteworthy primarily for their use of non-corporate forms, such as limited
partnerships and limited liability companies. This Article argues that these
recent offerings have done something even more significant—they have
developed a new governance model for large firms. This new model not
only rejects most of the protections that corporate shareholders have
become accustomed to, but also rejects most of the partnership and noncorporate governance mechanisms as well. What remains are investor
protection devices that do not rely on legal enforcement—mechanisms such
as the alignment of managers’ and outside investors’ economic interests
and reliance on reputational constraints to guide managerial behavior. This
Article investigates in detail the formation documents and regulatory filings
of every private equity firm to conduct a public offering in the United
States. It describes how these firms have eliminated traditional governance
devices, both corporate and non-corporate, presents the primarily extralegal protections on which investors must rely, and raises questions and
concerns about the reliability and effectiveness of this new governance
model.
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INTRODUCTION
John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman famously
describe the function of corporate law as a mechanism for providing
business enterprises with a form that possesses certain desirable attributes:
“legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated
management . . ., and investor ownership.”1 Once this form is established,
1. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (2d ed. 2009).
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reducing costs of operating those businesses serves as a second, equally
important function of corporate law.2 Primary among these costs is the
need to monitor those who act opportunistically to the detriment of the
organization. These costs are also known as agency costs. Agency costs
may be fought in a variety of ways. Legislators and courts may adopt
broad legal rules in the form of statutes and precedent.3 Parties may
voluntarily enter into contracts that limit their behavior.4 These contracts
become legally binding obligations of the parties and may be enforced in
court. But, parties are not limited to, and do not constrain themselves to,
purely formal or legal strategies to minimize agency costs. They also craft
incentives to align the interests of the actors with those of the larger group
in the hope and expectation that those actors will act in the best interests of
the group, even absent some form of legal sanction.5
All forms of business organization use some combination of these
three methods, both legal and extra-legal, to combat agency costs.
Business organizations each have a foundational statute that allocates
authority, financial obligation, and entitlement.6
Many individual
businesses use contracts to further customize governance relationships,
often through such common forms as a partnership agreement or a
corporate shareholders agreement. All business entities also rely on extralegal means, such as financial incentive and reputational constraint, in
order to guide the conduct of their agents.
However, not all forms of business organization rely on these methods
to the same extent. In order to contain agency costs, public corporations
place a relatively heavy reliance on the first method: formal legal rules
such as mandatory shareholder voting and judicial enforcement of fiduciary
duties. Some believe that this reliance leads to inefficient monitoring and
to relatively poor performance. In fact, many private equity firms have
attributed their financial success to their ability to overcome these
shortcomings and to provide more efficient, engaged leadership.7
This financial success has led to an astonishing increase in demand to

2. Id. at 2.
3. See id. at 39 (discussing legislative strategies for reducing agency costs).
4. Id. at 23.
5. Id., at 42-43.
6. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007) (governing domestic and foreign
corporations); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (2006) (governing limited liability
companies); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) (governing general and limited partnerships).
7. See Martin Steindl, The Alignment of Interests Between the General and Limited
Partner in a Private Equity Fund—The Ultimate Governance Nut to Crack?, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 2 (Feb. 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2013/02/The-Alignment-of-Interests-betweenthe-General-and-the-Limited-Partner-in-a-Private-Equity-Fund__Full-Article-1.pdf
(discussing the superiority of private equity fund governance).
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invest in private equity firms. From only about $3 billion before 1980,8
investment in private equity jumped to more than $500 billion globally by
2007,9 when private equity firms were regularly outperforming broad
market averages over both the short and long term.10 Investors continued to
want to participate in this segment of the market, but participation had
traditionally been limited to institutions and other investors with very high
net worth.11 Some of the biggest firms recognized this intense demand and
provided a novel solution—they would conduct a public offering
themselves so that individual investors could purchase shares in their
management companies.12 These firms went public in 2007 when The
Blackstone Group, L.P., Fortress Investment Group, LLC, and Och-Ziff
Capital Management, LLC all held public offerings.13 The financial crisis
soon halted this trend, along with a great deal of economic activity across
the globe.14 Recently, the public offering of private equity firm shares has
resumed, with KKR & Co., L.P., Apollo Global Management, LLC,
Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, and The Carlyle Group, L.P. all now being
publicly traded in the United States.
Currently, there are seven publicly-held private equity firms (“PPE
Firms”) whose shares trade in the United States. As one might expect,
these PPE Firms do not operate as traditional public corporations.
Generally speaking, PPE Firms reject what they consider the inefficient

8. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 CHI. L. REV.
219, 225 (2009).
9. Id. at 225 n.28 (citing Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom or Bust?, 19 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44 (2007)).
10. See Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Equity, Private Lives, FORTUNE, Nov.
27, 2006, at 192, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/27/8394344/ (noting that
in both the last year and over the past ten years, private equity firms significantly
outperformed the S&P 500).
11. See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 465, 471 (2009) [hereinafter, Manesh, Legal Asymmetry] (noting that the 2007
IPOs of Blackstone, Fortress, and Och-Ziff opened the door to allow average investors
trading on the public markets to invest in private equity firms).
12. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 7 (2008) (describing private equity firms as traditionally private partnerships,
but stating that their business model is in flux).
13. See id. at 60 (describing a February 2007 IPO by Fortress Investment Group as the
catalyst of PPE firm public offerings, followed shortly thereafter by Blackstone); Manesh,
Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 465 (claiming that the 2007 initial public offerings of
the private equity firms Blackstone, Fortress, and Och-Ziff challenged the notion that
publicly held firms were organized as corporations, subject to the usual rules, checks, and
balances of standard corporate law).
14. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12 (discussing the potential of the recent
financial crisis to discredit the private equity model).
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monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance.15 In fact, PPE Firms
have chosen to organize not as corporations at all, but in every case as
either a limited partnership or limited liability company. Though unusual,
this is not unprecedented. There are eighty-five non-corporate firms that
are publicly-traded in the United States.16 Most of these firms have also
rejected mandatory legal rules such as shareholder voting and strong-form
fiduciary duties in favor of more customized contractual limits.17 Common
examples of contractual limitations preferred by non-corporate firms
include providing for a limited duration of the entity and requiring periodic
distributions to shareholders during the life of the organization.18 PPE
Firms are unique for uniformly rejecting the idea of replacing the
corporate-style mandatory legal rules with the non-corporate, customized
contractual rules. This leaves only the social norms and non-compulsory
incentives as the primary means of controlling the agency costs of PPE
Firms.
This Article describes public investors’ governance rights in PPE
Firms, compares those rights to protections provided in other entities, and
assesses their adequacy. Part I describes PPE Firms’ organizational
structure and places it in a broader governance context; explains the
dominant corporate governance model; contrasts that model both to how
PPE Firms operate corporations in which they invest and to the governance
structure that PPE Firms use in their own funds; and explains the difference
between investing in a PPE Firm (the primary concern of this article),
investing in a private equity firm’s operating fund, or investing in a
portfolio company run by that fund. Part II traces how PPE Firms have
stripped the primary governance mechanisms used by corporations from
their models primarily, though not exclusively, by incorporating broad
fiduciary duty waivers into their governing documents. It also describes
how PPE funds adopt corporate-style buffers, used by many public
corporations to avoid the harsher risks of direct shareholder interference in
governance, even though the PPE Firms are not subject to those risks in the
first instance. Part III notes that PPE Firms do not replace these missing
corporate governance mechanisms with the traditional non-corporate
mechanisms one might expect, and examines the practices of constraining
managerial discretion through mandatory distributions and finite duration.
In Part IV, the Article concludes that PPE Firms have developed a new
15. See infra Part II.
16. Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law:
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 558 (2011) [hereinafter
Manesh, Contractual Freedom].
17. See infra Part III.
18. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
289, 290 (2009) (discussing the use of limited firm duration and required distributions to
owners as a substitute for typical corporate monitoring devices).
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governance model that forsakes the protections of law almost entirely. To
the extent that outside investors are able to monitor and hold insiders
accountable, they do so primarily through extra-legal means such as
aligning the financial incentives of insiders with public investors and
relying on reputational checks to constrain managerial behavior. Finally,
Part V raises several questions and concerns about PPE Firms’ reliance on
extra-legal governance mechanisms.
I.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLICLY-HELD
PRIVATE EQUITY FIRM

In order to understand a public investor’s rights in a PPE Firm, it is
important to first understand the broader context of firm governance. This
Part begins with a general description of the primary features of corporate
governance, and then explains how private equity firms reject those
features, both in their investments and in the structure of their funds. Once
the differences in governance are established between corporations and
private equity firms, this Part turns to PPE Firms themselves. It identifies
that investors in PPE Firms have governance rights that differ from each of
these forms and that insiders in these firms owe conflicting allegiances to
different constituencies.
A. The Corporate Governance Model and the Private Equity
Alternative
The structure of corporate governance is based on the notion of
separating ownership and control—shareholders invest capital and directors
exercise control.19 Shareholders monitor directors through a variety of
mechanisms, the most prominent of which are the election of directors by
annual voting20 and the imposition of fiduciary duties upon the directors.21
Shareholder voting serves as a monitoring device by allowing those whose
capital is at stake to have a periodic say in the identity of those entrusted
with the power to make decisions on behalf of the organization. Fiduciary
19. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the corporate model wherein decision
makers within a corporation are not substantially affected financially by the outcome of
their decisions).
20. See Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 472 (describing shareholder
franchise as a standard corporate law tool intended to ensure that corporate managers remain
accountable to the owners of the firm).
21. See id, at 473 (noting that corporate law balances the weaknesses of shareholder
franchise by imposing upon managers certain fiduciary duties, a legally enforceable
minimum standard of conduct developed by courts and intended to ensure managerial
accountability); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 296 (explaining how corporate managers’
fiduciary duties supplement shareholder monitoring power).
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duties monitor directors by articulating a heightened standard of conduct to
which directors will be held accountable. Shareholders enforce this higher
standard through litigation. Scholars have written extensively about both
the strengths and weaknesses of this structure.22
To the extent that the shareholder franchise is effective, the role of
fiduciary duties becomes more limited.23 If shareholders can replace the
board annually, then the additional protection gained by labeling the
directors as fiduciaries involves the protection of minority shareholders.
However, shareholder voting is largely ineffective in most major public
corporations. This lack of an effective franchise means that the annual vote
for directors provides only a minimal monitoring check and that fiduciary
duties must play a larger role in monitoring boards of public companies.24
This combination of ineffective shareholder voting and heavy reliance on
fiduciary duties, usually enforced post hoc by shareholders bringing claims
for breach, leads many critics to challenge the efficacy of corporate
governance in monitoring managerial behavior.25
1.

Differences in Operating Portfolio Companies

Private equity firms have been vocal critics of the traditional corporate
governance system. Private equity firms attribute their investing success to
the ability to diverge from the norm of corporate governance.26 This
divergence is typified by the changes that private equity firms make to the
governance of corporations in whom they invest, often referred to as
portfolio companies. Once private equity firms make an investment, they
require a large degree of control, close monitoring of management, and
revision of compensation practices to closely align corporate success with
enhanced pay.27 Commentators have argued that the hands-on form of

22. See, e.g., Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11 at 473 (discussing the strengths
and weaknesses of corporate structures); see infra part III for a detailed discussion of these
other constraints.
23. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (’discussing the view that “as long as shareholders have
the power to replace the directors, corporate decisions can be expected to serve shareholder
interests.”).
24. See id. at 17 (discussing the lack of fiduciary duties in public companies).
25. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 19, at 18 (noting the lack of governance devices
available to shareholders in public companies).
26. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 8, at 227 (claiming that private equity
transactions create value by leading to improved corporate governance and therefore
reducing agency cost); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 299 (claiming that substituting these
incentive devices for monitoring is a particularly efficient tradeoff in private equity firms
given the high costs of constraining the discretion of expert managers).
27. Phillip Leslie & Paul Oyer, Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence
from Private Equity 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14331, 2008),
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governance employed by private equity provides many benefits, including
reducing managerial discretion to misuse free cash flow, realigning
managerial incentives, heightening managerial sensitivity to firm
performance, improving internal reporting, and enhancing the ability to
replace under-performing managers.28
This alternative governance seems to have been effective. Private
equity firms have long touted themselves as an alternative to, and often an
improvement on, public companies with traditional management
structures.29 Private equity firms have outperformed broad market
averages, over both the short and long terms, and both before and after the
recent financial crisis.30 Both popular and academic commentators attribute
this success to governance, the hands-on management of seasoned private
equity executives, and the clear and closely monitored incentives that
private equity firms provide to their portfolio companies.31
2.

Differences in Structuring Private Equity Funds

The corporate-style separation of ownership and control can be
inefficient and expensive, as described above. This can be particularly
difficult when attempting to monitor managers who employ some
specialization or expertise similar to investment and finance.32 Private
equity firms themselves, apart from their portfolio companies, have long
been regarded as a contrast to this structure. These firms do more than
simply act as hands-on managers of their funds. Instead, they forsake the

available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14331 (quoting literature that claims private
equity firms create value by improving management and citing three mechanisms that do
so).
28. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting executives at private equity firms
belittling traditional corporate governance mechanisms).
29. See Tony Jackson, Public-company model worse than private equity, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd8626b8-a304-11df-8cf400144feabdc0.html#axzz2OrojnKp2 (noting the benefits of the private equity structure
compared to public companies).
30. See Les Berglass, What Public Companies Can Learn from Private Equity, FORBES
(Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/hilfiger-starbucks-aig-financial-advisornetwork-private-equity.html (arguing that the ability to focus on larger goals, instead of
short snapshots in time, contributes to the success of private equity firms over public
companies); Colvin & Charan, supra note 10 (exploring strategies that private equity firms
use to make them more efficient than public companies, such as the exemption from
reporting salary in SEC filings).
31. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 8, at 219-20 (discussing the advantages that
private equity firms offer as opposed to public companies, such as the reduction of board
size and the improvement in the flow of information).
32. See id. (finding that private equity investors are better risk monitors with better
incentives than public shareholders at firms with significant derivative trading activity and
derivative contract positions).
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corporate form altogether and organize their investment funds as limited
partnerships or limited liability companies.33
When a private equity firm is structured as a partnership, professionals
who run the fund can be members of the general partner, owners of the
management services entity, or both. The professionals will cause a limited
partnership to be formed for the purpose of investing in portfolio
companies. They provide this fund with a small percentage of its capital
(usually one percent) and all of the investment and other operational
expertise. The fund managers will then raise money, usually from
institutional investors or high net-worth individuals. These investors
provide the capital used by the firm in its investments and become limited
partners in the private equity fund.
Investors in private equity funds do not have any of the corporate-style
monitoring protections. Instead of relying on voting and fiduciary
obligations as monitoring devices, the firms use a limitation on the duration
of the entity itself, a requirement that available funds be distributed to its
owners, and an alignment of economic interests between the managers and
the investors to ensure that those in control of the organization act in the
best interest of the investors.34 Limiting the duration of the firm gives the
managers an incentive to manage with a view toward producing returns in a
finite period of time. Mandatory distributions similarly focus the effort of
manager on producing returns that will be given to the investors. Finally,
the alignment of economic interest between manager and investor provides
the manager with a financial incentive to act in the interest of the
investor—when the investor makes money, so does the fund manager.
B. Introduction of the Publicly-held Private Equity Firms
This governance structure gains another level of complexity when
private equity firms issue shares to the public. PPE Firms invest in
portfolio companies, using hands-on management in an attempt to increase
33. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 298 (noting that private-equity buyout firms are a
leading example of the use of partnership mechanisms in governing large firms); see
William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 1, 1 (2008) (describing how private equity funds are organized); Joseph E.
Bachelder III, Executive Compensation, N. Y. L. J., August 29, 2007, available at
http://www.jebachelder.com/articles/070829.html (displaying an organizational chart of a
typical private equity fund).
34. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 298-99 (noting that buyouts are financed by funds
organized as limited partnerships managed by the buyout firm’s general partners, and
describing four incentives: “First, managers are motivated by high-powered incentive
compensation. . . . Second, partners are automatically cashed out of the fund on expiration
of the fund’s limited term . . . . Third, limited partnership agreements provide some
assurance of distributions . . . . Fourth, the discipline provided by the above features
substitutes for corporate-type monitoring”).
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returns, but the management company itself also issues shares to the public,
sharing its largely fee-based income with those new investors.
This structure is rather complex, as demonstrated by the organization
of the Blackstone Group, one of the first private equity firms to sell shares
to the public.35 In Blackstone, the private equity funds that invest in
portfolio companies are five distinct “Blackstone Holdings” limited
partnerships.36 Outside investors will invest in those limited partnerships,
which Blackstone will manage through general partnership entities.37 In
the end, these entities are consolidated in one management company, The
Blackstone Group, L.P.38 Public investors may participate in this
management company. The managers participate directly in the ownership
of the “Holdings” entities, and in the ownership of the public entity.
Early scholarship on these PPE Firms focused on the impact of public
ownership on the private equity business model.39 It was feared that any
advantages that governance of private equity firms had over traditional
corporations would be lost as these firms took on public shareholders.40
This scholarship also acknowledged that investors in the PPE Firms are in a
different position from the limited partners in a traditional private equity
fund.41 While limited partnerships receive the bulk of the capital from the
performance of portfolio companies, investors in PPE Firms are a step
removed. These investors are only entitled to a fraction of the management
and other fees that the managers of the private equity funds receive, which
is based on the overall size of the funds and the performance of the
portfolio companies.
This distinct position has implications for the governance of the firm.
Managers of PPE Firms are balanced in between two masters—the limited
partners of their funds, who invest capital and whose objective is to
maximize the returns on the fund’s portfolio while minimizing fees, and the

35. Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 16 (June 21,
2007).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 59 (claiming that it “could become a
trend that would fundamentally alter the private equity industry”) (citing Peter Smith,
Private Equity Seeds Public Vehicles, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at 19); see, e.g., Victor
Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89 (2008) (analyzing the tax incentives for
organizing in a non-corporate form).
40. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 8 (warning that public offerings of
private equity firms may become a trend and would radically transform the industry and that
“ultimately could culminate in private equity firms becoming broadly based financial groups
akin to elite investment banks.”).
41. See id. at 60 (commenting that PPE investor returns are generated by management
fees and carry interest, in contrast with the returns of limited partners, which stem directly
from the performance of portfolio companies).
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PPE investors, who hope to maximize fee income, as their return is entirely
derived from it.42 The remainder of this paper is devoted to an
investigation of how PPE Firms have solved this puzzle, and an assessment
of whether the solution is satisfactory.
One way that PPE Firms have assertively not solved the puzzle is
through traditional legal means. As described in Part II, PPE Firms lack
almost all of the most basic shareholder protections found in corporate law.
This is not surprising, as none of the PPE Firms are corporations, and the
funds they operate are similarly lacking in these corporate characteristics.
Part III proceeds to describe that, unlike the private equity funds operated
by PPE Firms, the PPE Firm also lacks traditional legal protections found
in non-corporate entities.
Given this structure, one might wonder if PPE investors lack the
sophistication to recognize that their objectives are at odds with those of
the limited partners. But such an assessment does not paint the entire
picture. Sophisticated institutions are invested in these firms and new firms
continue to go public, yet the market has not collapsed on them. The
assertion that investors are irrational or delusional does not provide a
satisfactory answer to this phenomenon. Instead, a clearer, more complete
picture is revealed when taking into account both legal and extra-legal
investor protections. As described in Part IV, PPE Firms rely almost
entirely on extra-legal mechanisms of investor protection. Relying on these
extra-legal methods can be both rational and efficient. However, this
reliance exposes PPE investors to significant risks, as discussed in Part V
of this article.
II.

(NON-)USE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES BY
PPE FIRMS

Corporations have developed many mechanisms over the years by
which shareholders can hold directors accountable. The two primary
methods are the shareholder franchise and the imposition of fiduciary
duties. This Part will describe the approach that PPE Firms take with
regards to both of these accountability mechanisms. Shareholder voting is
not an effective check on managerial discretion in PPE Firms.43 Because
the managers of PPE Firms own such a large percentage of the overall
42. See id. at 65 (warning that “[o]nce a public offering has been carried out, those
running a private equity firm have to carry out a delicate balancing act, seeking to maximize
the fee-income driven returns of unit holders (or shareholders) while pleasing limited
partners in the buyout funds who are ultimately paying those fees”).
43. See infra Part II.A (noting that it is not necessarily a bad thing for controlling
shareholders to have discretion to make operational decisions, but is more risky, as private
equity managers can receive significant compensation from sources other than their share
ownership).
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equity of the firm, insiders can control the outcome of virtually every
matter that could be put to a vote. Also, these firms do not submit many
important matters to shareholder vote. In PPE entities, voting is limited to
certain matters, and significant authority is delegated to a general partner,
manager, or similar body, over which shareholders have little or no control.
This lack of effective voice through voting places a greater emphasis on
fiduciary duties as a method for investor protection.
Fiduciary duties have been thoroughly gutted by PPE Firms.44 Several
firms waive the duties entirely, or waive them with regard to large areas of
insider conduct. For those duties that remain, many PPE Firms eliminate
personal liability of insiders for breach. Finally, all of the PPE Firms
provide conflict cure provisions in their organizing documents. These
provisions have the potential to define away many conflicts in the same
manner as the fiduciary obligations owed to the firm.
There is one aspect of corporate governance that PPE Firms have
embraced—the adoption of measures to insulate boards from shareholder
interference.45 So, even though shareholders initially have little or no
power, PPE Firm managers have adopted several prominent devices that
protect them from unwanted shareholder interference. The most popular of
these devices are the adoption of staggered boards, the inclusion of control
share acquisition triggers, and opting out of NYSE governance rules.
A. The Ineffective Protection Afforded by Voting Rights
Corporate shareholders use voting as a means of monitoring director
behavior and participating in firm governance. Voting is typically utilized
for the annual election of directors, the approval of fundamental
transactions, or for changes to the corporate charter. This tool can be
effective, particularly in the close corporation setting, but is often
ineffective in large corporations with widely dispersed shareholders.
None of the seven PPE Firms provide for meaningful shareholder
voting.46 The organizational documents of PPE Firms typically allow for
managers to exercise broad discretion without having their authority
subjected to a shareholder vote. Further, insiders own such a large portion
of the voting control of their firms that all major decisions put to a vote can
be decided with the assent of insiders, without regard to the preferences of
the public investors.

44. See infra Part II.B (discussing PPE Firms’ ability to circumvent fiduciary duties
through use of unincorporated entities).
45. See infra Part II.C (discussing PPE Firms’ use of three corporate governance
methods to protect managers from unwanted shareholder interference).
46. See infra Part V.A (noting that lack of shareholder voting can become an issue
because of the potential for dis-alignment of economic interests).
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1. Majority Control in PPE Firms
Voting does not give public shareholders a voice in PPE Firm
management because they are all heavily insider-owned.47 As a result,
public shareholders do not have enough votes to take or block action. On
the one hand, the retention of majority voting control by insiders simply
reflects that insiders continue to own a significant portion of the economic
interest in the firm. This connection between ownership and control is one
of the techniques the private equity firms use in their portfolio companies
and one that they tout as an improvement over traditional corporate
governance.48 On the other hand, however, PPE Firms divide their shares
into separate classes to ensure that insiders retain majority-voting rights
that may diverge substantially from their economic interest in the firm. In
each case, as illustrated in the chart below, insiders continue to control a
very large portion of voting control on the date of the firm’s IPO. This
voting control relates to, but does not directly correlate with, the economic
interest held by insiders.

47. Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 570. Professor Manesh’s study
did not collect ownership data on all publicly held alternative entities. As Manesh explains,
“[b]ecause this study focuses on operating agreements and not ownership structure, we did
not examine the extent to which a firm’s managers are also full-fledged owners of the firm,
a matter that is, at least partly, outside of the terms of the contract.” Id.
48. See supra part I.A.1.
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% Voting Rights of
Insiders at IPO
86.5%49
87.3%50
100%, except in unusual
circumstances.51
Approx. 90%52
75%53
98.23%54
74.4%55

49. Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008).
Leon Black, Joshua Harris, and Mark Rowan, AGM’s managing partners, own and control
BRH Holdings GP, Ltd. (“BRH”), the general partner of BRH Holdings LP (“Holdings”).
BRH is a limited partnership that is 100% owned, directly and indirectly, by AGM’s
managing and contributing partners. Through BRH, AGM’s managing and contributing
partners own 71.1% of the Apollo Operating Group (“AOG”) limited partnership interests.
AGM issued BRH a single Class B share solely to grant BRH voting power. The share
initially had 240,000,000 votes per share, and represented 86.5% of the total voting power
of the AGM shares entitled to vote. However, the voting power of the Class B share is not
static; it fluctuates in accordance with changes in Holdings’ economic interest in the AOG
entities. Id.
50. Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement 235 (Form S-1) (June 21,
2007). Blackstone issued one “special voting unit” to Blackstone Partners LLC (“BP
LLC”). Blackstone’s senior managing directors wholly own BP LLC. This “special voting
unit” provides Blackstone’s prior owners with a number of votes equal to the aggregate
number of vested and unvested BPUs held by the limited partners of Blackstone Holdings
(excluding Blackstone and its subsidiaries) on the relevant record date and entitles the prior
owners to participate in the vote on the same basis as the common unitholders. Immediately
after the IPO, the special voting unit issued to BP LLC represented 87.3% of the total voting
power of Blackstone’s units. Id.
51. Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement 242-43 (Form S-1) (Sept. 6, 2011).
52. Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement 8, 124 (Form S-1) (Nov. 8, 2006).
Through their ownership of the class B shares, which represent 90% of the voting power of
the FIG LLC shares, the principals control the election of the directors. Id.
53. KKR & Co., Registration Statement 160 (Form S-1) (July 3, 2007). KKR
Management LLC (“KKR LLC”) manages KKR, its General Partner (“Managing Partner”).
KKR LLC is a limited liability company governed by a six-person Board of Directors.
KKR’s founders, directors and co-CEOs—Kravis and Roberts—who control 75% of the
shares entitled to vote on the election of directors, appoint all of the directors on KKR
LLC’s Board of Directors. Id.
54. Oaktree Capital Grp., LLC, Registration Statement 57 (Form S-1) (June 17, 2011).
Currently, of the matters that must be submitted to an OCG shareholder vote, the only
matter that the principals could not control by virtue of their indirect control of the class B
shares and the 98.23% of the voting power that they represent is a proposed amendment to
the OCG operating agreement: (1) that would have a material adverse effect on class A
relative to class B, (2) that is not in a shareholder-approved merger agreement, and (3) that
the board does not have explicit permission to make without shareholder approval by virtue
of Section 10.3. Id.
55. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement 40 (Form S-1) (Nov. 9,
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2. Further Minimizing Minority Voice
Even if public investors control a significant portion of the PPE Firms’
shares, the firms have developed devices to minimize the input of outsiders.
Strategies employed include providing a mechanism for insiders to elect a
majority of the board or similar governing body, regardless of ownership
interest; limiting number of issues that may be put to a shareholder vote;
and continuing super-voting privileges of special classes of stock.
A smaller governing body, often called a “board,” whose members are
largely appointed by insiders, manages each of the seven PPE Firms. In a
typical provision, Och-Ziff accomplishes this by dividing its shares into
two classes, class A and class B, and issues class A shares to the public
while retaining class B shares for insiders.56 Then, its operating agreement
provides that class B shareholders have the right to elect five of the seven
members of the board.57 This type of voting limitation is common among
both PPE Firms and publicly traded entities that are not corporations
generally.58
Narrowing the number of issues that a public shareholder may vote on
is another common device that limits voting rights. Each PPE Firm uses
this mechanism to some extent and KKR provides a fairly typical set of
provisions. KKR’s partnership agreement limits voting to matters that
include a transfer of a majority of the managing partnership interest to an
outside entity, an election to dissolve the partnership, or a merger or sale of
substantially all of the partnership’s assets.59 Carlyle’s partnership
2007). The class B shareholders own no economic rights in OZM and 74.4% of the total
combined voting power of outstanding OZM shares, provided that the underwriters exercise
their option to purchase additional Class A shares. Id.
56. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Annual Report 46 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28,
2011).
57. Id. Under the Class B shareholder agreement, the class B Shareholder Committee
(whose sole member is currently Och) has the ability to designate five of the seven directors
on the OZM board of directors as long as the OZM partners and their permitted transferees
own shares representing more than 40% of the total combined voting power of all
outstanding OZM class A and class B shares.
58. Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 580 (noting that “[o]f the 85 firms
studied, the operating agreement of only 22 firms grant public unitholders the right to elect
all or at least a majority of the members of the firm’s governing body (the board of
managers, in the case of LLCs, or the board of directors of the general partner, in the case of
LPs). Interestingly, the right to elect the firm’s managers appears to be more common
among LLCs than LPs”(internal citation omitted)).
59. KKR & Co., supra note 53, at 173. Common Unitholders have only limited voting
rights relating to a few matters affecting their investment, and thus have limited ability to
influence the decisions of Management regarding the business. First, the Managing Partner
is not permitted to transfer all or any part of its Managing Partner Interest (represented by
Managing Partner Units) to any Person prior to December 23, 2018, without approval by the
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agreement is even more restrictive. According to Carlyle’s registration
statement, it has the power to take all management decisions internally, and
it does not contemplate holding any public shareholders’ meetings in the
foreseeable future.60
A final mechanism for minimizing the participation of public investors
in the voting process is perpetuating the special voting rights of the control
group long after it has ceased to hold a majority of either the economic or
the voting interest in the firm. For example, Apollo includes a provision in
its operating agreement that its control group will continue to manage the
business and affairs of the company as long as it retains at least a 10%
voting interest in the firm.61 That a 10% interest is well below a majority is
self-evident. Because insiders currently own a large portion of the equity
of the firm, there is no obvious disconnect between the financial interest of
insiders and that of public investors, but at 10% there very well could be.

prior written consent or vote of Limited Partners holding at least a majority of the voting
power of the Outstanding Voting Units (excluding Voting Units held by the Managing
Partner or its Affiliates). KKR & Co., Registration Statement app. 3.2 (Form S-1/A),
Amended and Restated Partnership Agreement 16 § 4.6(a) (June 3, 2010). Second, the
following actions require the approval of the holders of a majority of the voting power of
outstanding units: (1) sales, exchanges, or dispositions of all or substantially all of the
Partnership Group’s assets, (2) an election to dissolve the Partnership by the Managing
Partner, (3) mergers other than those that are solely for the purpose of effecting a change of
form into a different limited liability entity in which the Managing Partner and the Limited
Partners have the same rights and obligations. Id. at 26 § 7.3, 40 § 12.1(b), 50 § 14.3(b).
60. Carlyle Grp. L.P., supra note 51. Carlyle has a more aggressive system. As long
as the “Carlyle Partners Ownership Condition” is met, meaning that holders of the Carlyle
Group L.P. (“CGL”) special voting units (including voting units held by the General Partner
Carlyle Group Management, L.L.C. (“CGM LLC”) and its affiliates) in their capacity as
such, or otherwise held by then-current or former Carlyle personnel (treating voting units
deliverable to such persons pursuant to outstanding equity awards being held by them),
collectively, constitute at least 10% of the voting power of the outstanding CGL voting
units, CGM LLC’s Board of Directors will be elected in accordance with its operating
agreement, which provides that directors may be appointed and removed by members of
CGM LLC holding a majority in interest of the voting power of the members. Each
member has voting power according to his or her aggregated ownership of CGL Common
Units and Carlyle Holdings (“CH”) partnership units. Once the total voting power held by
the holders of the CGL special voting units (including voting units held by the General
Partner and its affiliates) in their capacity as such, or otherwise held by then-current or
former Carlyle personnel (treating voting units deliverable to such persons pursuant to
outstanding equity awards as being held by them), collectively, constitutes less than 10% of
the voting power of the outstanding voting units of CGL, the Common Unitholders are
entitled to elect the directors of the General Partner. Id.
61. Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, supra note 49. The control condition in the AGM
operating agreement provides that as long as the “Apollo Group” beneficially owns at least
10% of the aggregate number of votes by holders of outstanding voting shares, AGM’s
manager will manage all AGM operations and activities and will have discretion over
significant corporate actions. Id.
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B. Treatment of Fiduciary Duties
In corporate entities, the lack of effective shareholder voting increases
the emphasis placed on fiduciary duties as a governance mechanism.
Unlike corporations, however, PPE Firms are able to decrease the impact
and significance of fiduciary duties. The ability of PPE Firms to disregard
fiduciary duties stems from the choice these firms make to be
unincorporated entities. While Delaware corporate law allows for some
flexibility with regard to the treatment and imposition of fiduciary duties,
much of the law is mandatory and unwaivable. In contrast, Delaware’s
LLC and limited partnership statutes allow for the modification or
complete elimination of fiduciary duties.62 This freedom allows PPE Firms
to limit, modify or even waive fiduciary duties as they see fit.63
A search for fiduciary duty elimination or modification in PPE Firms
only tells part of the story. Regardless of the particular approach taken by
any single PPE Firm on this issue, a combination of tactics used by all of
them minimizes or completely eliminates any protections that fiduciary
obligations are meant to provide. Tactics to do so include: elimination or
modification of the duties, elimination of personal liability for breach of
duties, and redefinition of the duties themselves, often through a “conflict
cure” provision in the operating or partnership agreement.64 Each of the
seven PPE Firms use these tactics in some combination, and the net effect
of these actions is that fiduciary duties do not provide any meaningful
protection for PPE investors.
The mere elimination of effective fiduciary protection is not unique to
PPE Firms. Professor Mohsen Manesh conducted a study of eighty-five
publicly traded firms that were not corporations and found similar results.
Almost half the PPE Firms waived fiduciary duties,65 most of the rest

62. Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 470 (noting that “Delaware’s
noncorporate statutes permit noncorporate firms to opt out of the fiduciary regime by
eliminating such duties wholesale.” Manesh concludes that “the 2007 IPOs highlight a
curious asymmetry in the law: in both substantive and structural respects, public
noncorporations can resemble their corporate counterparts. Yet, unlike corporations,
noncoprorations are able to avoid one of the most basic precepts, and arguably most
cumbersome obligation, of corporate law.”).
63. Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 567-69 (“Given the contractual
freedom afforded under Delaware law, LLCs and LPs can take one of three approaches to
fiduciary duties. First, a firm may choose to waive fiduciary duties altogether . . . .
Second, . . . . a firm may want to modify or displace only certain aspects or applications of
fiduciary duties . . . . Finally, third, instead of waiving or even limiting the application of
fiduciary duties, a firm may intend for fiduciary duties to apply in full”).
64. Id. at 570 (noting that the PPE Firms looked for provisions waiving substantive
fiduciary duties and provisions that eliminate manager liability for breach of fiduciary duties
(internal citation omitted)).
65. Id. at 574 (noting that of the eighty-five firms studied, “42 firms fully waive the
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eliminated personal liability for their breach,66 and almost all of the firms
had some form of conflict cure provision.67 PPE Firms follow a similar
pattern with regard to fiduciary waivers.68 Where PPE Firms distinguish
themselves from the other non-corporate entities in Professor Manesh’s
study is their use of corporate board-insulating devices and their approach
to non-corporate investor protections.
1. Waiver
The most straightforward approach regarding fiduciary duties is to
take advantage of the flexibility in the statute and eliminate or modify them
by agreement. In fact, all seven PPE Firms have done this to some extent.
Apollo and Carlyle have gone the furthest in this regard, eliminating
fiduciary duties altogether. Apollo’s operating agreement provides that “to
the fullest extent permitted by Applicable Law, neither the [AGM]
Manager nor any other Indemnified Person shall have any duties or
liabilities, including fiduciary duties, to the Company, any Member, or any
other Person bound by this [operating] Agreement.”69 Carlyle’s Partnership
Agreement provides for elimination in similarly sweeping language.70
The other five PPE Firms do not eliminate fiduciary duties altogether,
but do significantly modify them, usually limiting liability to instances of
fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct. The KKR partnership
agreement modifies the potential liability of KKR’s managing partner by
providing that the Managing Partner will not be liable for any breach of

fiduciary duties of the firm’s managers. Another 33 firms have eliminated liability arising
from the breach of fiduciary duties. Only 10 of the 85 firms studied do not fully waive or
exculpate liability arising from the breach of fiduciary duties.”).
66. Id. at 577-78 (finding that for those thirty-three firms, “even if a manager may be
bound by fiduciary duties, the manager will not be personally liable for monetary damages
caused by the breach of any fiduciary duty, unless, again, the manager’s actions fit into one
of the contractually carved-out categories of culpable conduct expressly set forth in the
firm’s operating agreement.” (internal citation omitted)).
67. Id. at 585 (stating that “practically all alternative entity firms include a conflict-ofinterests provision that describes the circumstances in which the managers of the firm may
engage in a self-dealing or conflicted transaction—the contractual analog to the common
law fiduciary duty of loyalty.”).
68. See Steindl, supra note 7, at 8 (noting while this approach appears to be common,
not all agree it is wise. For example, the Institutional Limited Partners Association, a group
that advocates on behalf of investors in private equity funds, has recommended that LPs
should avoid provisions that allow general partners to reduce or eliminate fiduciary duties).
69. Apollo Global Mgmt, LLC, Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Co. Operating Agmt.
(Form S-1) 38 (July 13, 2007).
70. The Carlyle Group L.P., Amended and Restated Agmt. of Ltd. P’ship (Form 8-K)
26 (May 8, 2012) (“[T]o the fullest extent permitted by law, the General Partner . . . shall
[not have any fiduciary duties and shall] only be subject to any contractual standards
imposed” under the Partnership Agreement.”).
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fiduciary duty unless a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final, nonappealable judgment finding that the Managing Partner acted in bad faith
(did not subjectively believe that the decision made or not made was in
KKR’s best interest), engaged in fraud, or engaged in willful misconduct.71
The Och-Ziff operating agreement provides that “to the fullest extent
permitted by applicable law our directors or officers will not be liable to us
other than in instances of fraud, gross negligence and willful misconduct.”72
Oaktree Capital takes a slightly different approach. It has both a manager
and a board of directors. While the operating agreement relieves the
Manager of its legal, equitable, and fiduciary duties to the maximum extent
permitted by law, it only modifies the duty and liability of the directors and
officers. As a general rule, the directors and officers have the duties of care
and loyalty that the directors and officers of a Delaware corporation owe to
the corporation and the shareholders respectively. However, in order to
impose liability on a director or officer, a plaintiff must show both a breach
of fiduciary duty and either fraud, willful malfeasance, gross negligence, or
commission of a felony or other material violation of law.73 Blackstone
also has a unique mix. It only imposes liability based on fraud, or willful
misconduct.74 Fortress similarly modified, but not completely eliminated,
the potential liability of its managers for breaches of their fiduciary
duties.75
2. Elimination of Personal Liability
Another method for minimizing the impact of fiduciary duties is to
eliminate the personal liability of managers who breach. This technique is
common in corporate law, but the corporation statutes all limit the ability to
exculpate. Corporations cannot eliminate liability for breaches of the duty
of loyalty or other specified acts, leaving only duty of care breaches subject
to exculpation. There is no similar limitation on limited partnerships and

71. KKR & Co. L.P., Amended and Restated Ltd. P’ship Agmt. (Form 8-K) 31 (July
14, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1404912/000110465910038689/a1014121_1ex3d1.htm.
72. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 41 (Feb. 28,
2011).
73. Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, Third Amended and Restated Operating Agmt. (Form
S-1) 31 (Mar. 30, 2012).
74. Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 220 (June 21,
2007).
75. Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC, Fourth Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Agmt. (Form 10Q) §5.19 (a)&(b), 39-40 (August 10, 2009).
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LLCs, so this sort of exculpatory provision can have even more of an
effect.
Two of the seven PPE Firms have added exculpatory provisions,
Carlyle and Och-Ziff. Carlyle’s partnership agreement eliminates the
liability of the general partner and the directors of the general partner for
any loss, damages, or fines unless a final non-appealable judgment is
rendered concluding that the general partner and/or the directors acted in
bad faith, engaged in fraud, or engaged in willful misconduct.76 In its
partnership agreement, the limited partners also expressly acknowledge that
the general partner has no obligation to consider their separate interests in
deciding whether to cause the partnership to take or decline to take any
action and that the general partner will not be liable to limited partners for
monetary damages or equitable relief for losses sustained, liabilities
incurred, or benefits not derived by the limited partners in connection with
their decisions to take or not take actions.77 Och-Ziff’s operating
agreement also provides that OZM will indemnify their directors and
officers for acts and omissions to the fullest extent permitted by law, other
than in instances of fraud, gross negligence, and willful misconduct, against
all expenses and liabilities arising from the performance of any of their
obligations or duties in connection with their service as OZM directors or
officers.78
3. Conflict Cures
In addition to these two mechanisms for minimizing the impact of
fiduciary duty breaches, each of the seven PPE Firms provide for “conflict
cure” provisions in their organizational documents. A conflict cure
provision provides a procedure that, if followed, allows the entity or one of
its principals to engage in a conflict of interest transaction without facing
liability or other negative consequences. The Fortress provision is typical
in that it specifies a procedure, that will result in the Board’s resolution of a
potential conflict of interest by deeming it a breach of the operating
agreement or any legal, equitable, or fiduciary duty.79 The operating
agreement also attempts to completely insulate the directors from liability
based on corporate opportunity doctrine, so long as they do not engage in a
competing business or activity because of confidential information

76. The Carlyle Group L.P., Amended and Restated Agmt. of Ltd. P’ship (Form 8-K)
21, 25-27 (May 08, 2012).
77. Id.
78. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1)
55 (Nov. 9, 2007).
79. Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC, Fourth Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Agmt. (Form 10Q) 42-43 (Aug. 10, 2009).
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provided by Fortress to the director.80 Finally, if the Board resolves a
conflict of interest based on its own determination that a transaction is fair
and reasonable or on terms no less favorable than those available from third
parties, rather than by having their course of action approved by their
conflicts committee or by a majority of disinterested shareholders, the
operating agreement provides that in the event the board is sued, the
plaintiff has the burden of rebutting a presumption that the board acted in
good faith in resolving the conflict of interest.81
C. Embracing the Buffer—Inclusion of Provisions that Insulate the
Board
Up to this point, the PPE Firms are acting in a manner expected of
firms that are not corporations. Both the small-firm partnership model,
which we see in private equity fund formation, and the large-firm
alternative entities in Professor Manesh’s study reject fiduciary duties as an
effective monitoring device. However, PPE Firms did not ignore corporate
governance altogether, as its counterparts did. Instead, PPE Firms
incorporate heavily from one area of corporate governance—those
provisions that boards adopt to insulate themselves from shareholder
intrusion. The use of these devices, particularly staggered boards, control
share acquisition triggers, and governance rule opt-outs, is particularly
striking because the context of their adoption is so far removed from the
norm.
1. Staggered Boards
Normally, all of a corporation’s directors are up for election every
year. However, state corporation laws allow for longer terms, so that the
board can be divided into a handful of classes that only get elected every
few years. Proponents of staggered boards argue that retaining a portion of
the directorate each year promotes continuity. Skeptics of the practice see
it as a way to prevent hostile takeovers. If it takes two or three years until a
majority shareholder has the power to elect its own board, a majority
shareholder is much less likely to launch a hostile bid and much more
likely to negotiate with the incumbent board.
Even though none of the PPE Firms are corporations, most
incorporate some sort of board-like structure into their governance
arrangements. Of those that do, Fortress, Och-Ziff, and Carlyle make a
point to extend the term of their directors beyond the typical one-year

80. Id.
81. Id.
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duration. Fortress and Och-Ziff use the traditional staggered approach.82
Ordinarily, Fortress directors are elected for a three-year term by the
shareholders at their annual meeting,83 and Och-Ziff has a staggered board
that is divided into three classes of nearly equal size.84
2. Control Share Acquisition Triggers
Another device that corporations use to protect against excessive
shareholder power is to prevent outsiders who accumulate a significant
percentage of stock in the company from voting their newly-acquired
shares. This practice deters any shareholder from acquiring 20% or more
of the shares of the company without first negotiating with the board.
Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, and Carlyle all have similar provisions in their
governing documents that incorporate this device. Apollo’s operating
agreement, for example, states that:
[I]f at any time any person or group (other than our manager and
its affiliates, or a direct or subsequently approved transferee of
our manager or its affiliates) acquires, in the aggregate, beneficial
ownership of 20% or more of any class of shares then
outstanding, that person or group will lose voting rights on all of
its shares and the shares may not be voted on any matter and will
not be considered to be outstanding when sending notices of a
meeting of shareholders, calculating required votes, determining
the presence of a quorum or for other similar purposes.85
This means that any person or group that is the record owner of 20% or
more of the outstanding class A shares is not entitled to vote at meetings of
the class A shareholders or to act upon matters as to which class A
shareholders have a right to vote or to act. Blackstone,86 KKR,87 and
Carlyle88 have similar provisions.
82. Id. at 42-46.
83. Id. at 36.
84. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp., supra note 54, at 180.
85. Apollo Global Mgmt., Apollo Global Management, LLC (Form S-1) 216 (Apr. 8,
2008).
86. The Blackstone Grp., The Blackstone Group L.P. (Form S-1/A) 235 (June 21,
2007). The Blackstone partnership agreement contains provisions that will thwart a potential
take-over attempt. Blackstone’s limited partnership agreement contains a poison pill. If at
any time any person or group other than the general partner, its affiliates, or a direct or
subsequently approved transferee of the general partner or its affiliates, acquires beneficial
ownership of 20% or more of any class of Blackstone common units then outstanding, that
person or group will lose voting rights on all of its common units. The common units may
not be voted on any matter and will not be considered to be outstanding when sending
notices of a meeting of common unitholders, calculating required votes, determining the
presence of a quorum or for other similar purposes. Id.
87. KKR & Co., Limited Partnership Agreement (Form S-1) 6, 38 (Mar. 3, 2010).
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3. NYSE Governance Rules Opt-outs
State corporation statutes are not the only source of shareholder
protection. Exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ have listing standards
that also include substantive governance rules. In the wake of the Enron
and related corporate scandals at the turn of the century, the NYSE in
particular implemented a number of rules designed to ensure that
independent directors would exercise oversight over corporate activities.
Although those rules are mandatory for most companies, there are
exceptions. Apollo, Oaktree, KKR and Carlyle have each availed
themselves of those exceptions.
Apollo (hereinafter “AGM”) describes a philosophical reason for
avoiding the rules: a desire to preserve a management structure based on
strong central control by its current managing partners Black, Rowan and
Harris.89 AGM therefore availed itself of the “controlled company”
exception from certain NYSE governance rules.90
This exception
eliminates the requirement that AGM have a majority of independent
directors on the board of directors, and that it have a compensation
committee and a nominating and corporate governance committee
composed entirely of independent directors.91

KKR’s Partnership Agreement provides that if at any time, any Person or Group (other than
the Managing Partner or its Affiliates) Beneficially Owns 20% or more of any class of
Outstanding Common Units, all Common Units owned by such Person or Group shall not
be entitled to be voted on any matter and shall not be considered to be outstanding when
sending notices of a meeting of Limited Partners to vote on any matter (unless otherwise
required by law), calculating required votes, determining the presence of a quorum or for
other similar purposes. However, the Units will be considered outstanding for purposes of
one provision of the Partnership Agreement, which provides that if the Managing Partner
voluntarily withdraws by giving 90 days advance notice to the Limited Partners, it will not
constitute a breach of the Partnership Agreement if at such time one Person and its Affiliates
beneficially own of record or otherwise control at least 50% of the Outstanding Common
Units. In addition, the units will be considered Outstanding and the limitation will not apply
(1) to any Person or Group who acquires 20% or more directly from the Managing Partner
or its Affiliates, (2) to any Person or Group who acquires 20% or more from a person who
acquired 20% or more from the Managing Partner or its Affiliates, provided that the
Managing Partner sent written notice to the Person or Group that the limitation would not
apply, or (3) to any Person or Group who acquired 20% or more with the prior approval of
the Board of Directors. Id.
88. The Carlyle Grp., The Carlyle Group L.P. (Form S-1) 16 (Sept. 6, 2011). Carlyle’s
Partnership Agreement provides that any Common Units held by a person that beneficially
owns 20% or more of any class of the CGL Common Units then outstanding (other than the
General Partner or its affiliates, or a direct or subsequently approved transferee of the
General Partner or its affiliates) cannot be voted on any matter. Id.
89. Apollo Global Mgmt., supra note 85, at 171.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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KKR took a different approach and, while technically insisting that it
is exempt from NYSE rules relating to board independence, KKR claimed
it wants a majority of directors who are independent under NYSE rules.92
The KKR board also voluntarily follows the NYSE rule on committees,
naming an audit committee, a conflicts committee, a nominating and
corporate governance committee, and an executive committee, all of which
operate pursuant to written charters.93
Carlyle (hereinafter “CGL”) and Oaktree simply opted out without
explanation, as they are entitled to do. CGL stated that it intends to avail
itself of the limited partnership exception from certain governance rules.94
Having done so, CGL will not be required to have a majority of
independent directors, to have independent director oversight of executive
officer compensation and director nominations, or to hold annual
meetings.95 In listing its class A units, Oaktree also used the “controlled
company” exemption from the NYSE rules. In particular, Oaktree does not
require (1) a majority of independent directors, (2) a compensation
committee, or (3) a nominating and corporate governance committee
composed entirely of independent directors.96
III.

PPE REJECTION OF NON-CORPORATE LEGAL NORMS—
DURATION LIMITS AND MANDATORY DISTRIBUTIONS

As seen in the study of PPE Firms’ use of corporate governance
provisions, investors should expect very few, if any, traditional corporatestyle protections against managerial overreaching. However, the corporate
paradigm is not the only source for investor protection and agency cost
reduction. Non-corporate entities have developed their own systems for
this purpose and have arrived at solutions different from corporations. As
Professor Larry Ribstein notes, unincorporated entities “align managers’
and owners’ interests by making the managers partners in the firm,
committing them to make distributions to owners, and providing for a
limited term.”97 These devices are better tailored to the typical, smaller
non-corporate setting, as “[t]hese incentive and disciplinary mechanisms
substitute for costlier and often ineffective corporate-type monitoring

92. KKR & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 235 (Dec. 31, 2012).
93. Id.
94. The Carlyle Grp., supra note 70, at 203.
95. Id. at 203-04.
96. Oaktree Capital Grp., Oaktree Capital Group, LLC (Form S-1) 7 (June 17, 2011).
97. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 290. See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16,
at 564 (discussing Ribstein’s three “uncorporate” governance devices: mandatory
distributions, limited lifetime followed by mandatory liquidation, and managers as fullfledged owners).
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devices, including the use of independent directors, owner voting, and
fiduciary duties.”98
Two of these three protections, the mandatory distribution provision
and the limited duration, provide investors with legally enforceable rights.99
If a manager fails to distribute cash as contractually obligated, or does not
wind up the business at the agreed-upon end date, investors can bring an
action in court to compel performance. The third governance mechanism,
manager-ownership, has no such enforceability mechanism. It works more
indirectly, relying on the likelihood that managers will want to do well for
themselves and will therefore provide positive outcomes for investors as
well.
PPE Firms have thoroughly rejected the first two devices that have
legal enforceability mechanisms and just as strongly have embraced the
alignment of economic incentives. Duration and distribution limits work
because they constrain the discretion of management, both in the short and
long term. Mandatory distributions reduce shareholders’ need to monitor
how managers use cash. Scholars have opined that requiring “managers to
distribute the firm’s earnings to its owners [in this way] can be an efficient
way to constrain agency costs.”100 Similarly, setting a time for termination
and liquidation limits managerial discretion. Forcing managers to return to
the capital markets to raise cash at the termination of each fund exposes
them to “the discipline of the capital markets.”101
This approach is followed by private equity funds and, generally, by
privately-owned firms organized as non-corporations. A typical fund, for
example, is established for a limited period of time, generally ten years, and
available cash is required to be distributed in the interim. Professor
Manesh found that even publicly-traded non-corporate entities rely on these
devices to a certain extent:
[O]f the 85 firms studied, the operating agreements of 12 do not
compel either periodic distributions or liquidation upon a preset
date. The remaining 73 firms use one or both of these
uncorporate substitutes, with 69 firms compelled to make
periodic distributions of all of the firm’s “available cash,” and 20
firms compelled to dissolve and liquidate upon a preset future
date.102

98. Id.
99. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 2 (describing how buyout fund limited partnership
agreements affect blockholder incentive problems).
100. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 290-91.
101. Id. at 292.
102. Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 578.
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This approach therefore holds true for both private and publicly owned
firms, although Professor Manesh also finds that the constraints are not as
effective in the public context.103
PPE Firms are uniform in their rejection of these devices. All seven
of them lack a termination date, and there are no indications that any plan
to liquidate at any future date. Mandatory interim distributions are
similarly non-existent, but with slightly more variety. Most simply state
that distributions are in the discretion of the board.104 Two firms, Apollo
and Blackstone, state their intentions to make distributions of available
cash while preserving their legal discretion to withhold or distribute as they
see fit.105
Apollo notes that it intends to distribute to its public shareholders all of
its net after-tax cash flow from operations in excess of amounts that the
manager determines are necessary or appropriate to provide for, among
other things, the conduct of the business or the making of appropriate
investments in the businesses or the funds.106 However, Apollo does not
assure shareholders that any dividends, quarterly or otherwise, will or can
be paid.107 The declaration, payment and determination of the amount of
the quarterly dividends are solely at the discretion of Apollo’s manager.108
Blackstone similarly states that it intends to distribute available cash.109

103. See id. at 579 (finding that “even for those firms that contractually commit to
regularly distribute all of the firm’s ‘available cash,’ that commitment is to some degree
illusory. This is because each firm’s operating agreement also grants the firm’s managers
substantial discretion to determine what constitutes ‘available cash’”). Further, despite the
frequent use of contractual provisions to waive or eliminate liability arising from the breach
of fiduciary duties, “publicly traded alternative entities have either not adopted uncorporate
substitutes or, more commonly, adopted uncorporate substitutes that only trivially constrain
managerial discretion.” Id. at 583.
104. See, e.g., Oaktree Capital Grp., LLC, Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Mar. 30, 2012) at A-25. OCG has sole discretion to periodically make distributions of cash
or other assets to the class A shareholders in accordance with their percentage interest in the
company on the date of distribution and the managing partner of KKR has the sole
discretion to authorize distributions, which shall be made Pro Rata in accordance with the
Partners’ respective Percentage Interest.
105. Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008),
at 76; Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) (June 21, 2007),
at 22-23.
106. Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008)
22 (outlining the rights of Apollo members).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement 82 (Form S-1) (June 21,
2007). To its common unitholders on a quarterly basis substantially all of Blackstone’s net
after-tax share of the annual adjusted cash flow from operating in excess of amounts
determined by the general partner to be necessary or appropriate to provide for the conduct
of the business, to make appropriate investments in the business and the funds, to comply
with applicable law, to comply with any debt instruments or other agreements, or to provide
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Blackstone states that the declaration and payment of any distributions is at
the sole discretion of Blackstone’s general partner and that it may change
Blackstone’s distribution policy at any time.110
IV.

PPE FIRMS AND THE REJECTION OF LAW AS A
GOVERNANCE MODEL

The fact that PPE Firms have turned away from legally enforceable
mechanisms that allow public investors to monitor insiders does not mean
that those investors are left without protection at all. As Michael Klausner
describes, many extra-legal forces can motivate good governance within
firms.111 In particular, he points to economic alignment and the
enforcement of professional norms as forces that can encourage positive
behavior from insiders, even absent the threat of legal sanction.112 This part
examines the use of these extra-legal mechanisms by private equity firms
generally, and by PPE Firms specifically.
A. Rejection of Legally Enforceable Limits
Extra-legal norms in the PPE setting operate largely in place of legal
constraints, in conjunction with them. As described in Part III, PPE Firms
are not meaningfully constrained by corporate-style protections such as
shareholder voting or fiduciary duty.113 They are similarly unburdened by
non-corporate governance mechanisms such as private contractual
obligations to limit duration or distribute income.114 For public investors in
for future distributions to the Blackstone common unitholders for any one or more of the
ensuing four quarters.
110. Id. at 83. Blackstone expressly gives itself much discretion in determining whether
and how to change its policy, stating that in determining whether to declare a dividend or
distribution, the general partner will take into account: general economic and business
conditions; Blackstone’s strategic plans and prospects; Blackstone’s business and
investment opportunities; Blackstone’s financial condition and operating results, including
our cash position, our netincome and our realizations on investments made by our
investment funds; working capital requirements and anticipated cash needs; contractual
restrictions and obligations, including payment obligations pursuant to the tax receivable
agreement and restrictions pursuant to our revolving credit facility; legal, tax and regulatory
restrictions; restrictions and other implications on the payment of distributions by us to our
common unitholders or by our subsidiaries to us; and such other factors as our general
partner may deem relevant.
111. Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate
Governance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91, 97-98 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie
Berlowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005).
112. Id.
113. See supra Part II (detailing the non-use of corporate governance by PPEs).
114. See supra Part III. See also Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 589.
Even with some of these non-corporate governance devices, there is some skepticism that
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PPE Firms, any protection the carrot of extra-legal incentive may provide
will need to occur without any significant stick in the form of legal
sanction.
B. Emphasis on Extra-legal Incentives
Two forms of extra-legal incentive used by PPE Firms are economic
alignment and reputational checks.
This section describes these
mechanisms. It examines the PPE Firms themselves, as well as private
equity’s use of both in their portfolio companies and in the formation of
their investment funds.
1. Focus on Economic Alignment
Managers of PPE Firms continue to own very large stakes in the firms
themselves.115 This ongoing interest should provide strong incentive for
those managers to make the firm financially successful. When the public
shareholders gain, the insiders gain too. In addition, if the public
shareholders lose, managers incur a similar loss in the value of their
holdings. PPE insiders already use this alignment strategy in both of the
other settings in which we have seen them operate: the formation of
investment funds and the investment by those funds in portfolio
companies.116
In the formation of an investment fund, the purpose of economic
alignment is to ensure that the professional fund managers are acting in a
way that will maximize the return for the limited partner investors.
Compensation in a typical fund is for the manager to charge a 2%
management fee, collect 20% carried interest, and invest 1% in the
ownership of the general partner.117 The 2% management fee is not

they would be effective in a publicly traded alternative entity. In conducting his study,
Professor Manesh notes that:
as a descriptive matter, publicly traded alternative entities are not the kind of
uncorporations that Professor Ribstein has envisioned. Rather than trading
corporate accountability mechanisms for high-powered contractual devices to
discipline and incentivize managers, publicly traded alternative entities appear
to utilize freedom of contract as a one-way ratchet: to reduce managerial
accountability without committing to meaningful contractual constraints on
managerial discretion.
Id.
115. Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 1 (“Managers as owners is a pillar of the PE
approach”).
116. Id.
117. David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn
Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance 2 (Charles A. Dice
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performance-based and does not serve the purpose of economic alignment.
The manager of a fund will collect its 2% annual fee regardless of
performance. The other items of compensation do attempt this alignment.
The 20% carried interest entitles the manager to 20% of the profits of the
firm, sometimes after pre-agreed upon thresholds have been met. This
element of incentive compensation strongly encourages managers to
maximize the profitability of the firm. The 1% co-investment performs a
similar function. Because managers invest personal funds in the firm, it is
in their interest for the firm to be profitable. Also, this co-investment
provision exposes managers to loss. If managers only had upside potential,
they may be encouraged to take excessive risks. Requiring managers’
money to be at risk tempers the temptation to take excessive risks. Also,
studies have produced evidence that this economic alignment has been
successful. An examination of funds with higher fixed fees118 and another
of funds with higher carried interest119 shows that both outperformed lower
fee funds to enough of an extent to justify their higher fees.
Private equity firms also use economic alignment when they invest
funds into portfolio companies. In this instance, the mechanism is not used
to monitor the professional fund managers; rather, it is used by the
professional fund managers to monitor executives at the companies where
they invest. Studies have shown that private equity-owned firms provide
much stronger economic incentives than comparable public companies.120
They accomplish this in several ways. First, private equity firms provide
large equity awards to executives at portfolio companies.121 Second, they
provide these awards to a broader range of executives than do typical
public companies.122 Third, they require these executives to purchase some
of these equity awards with their own capital, thus exposing them to both
the upside and downside risk of the investment.123

Center for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2011-14, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890777.
118. Id. at 2 (“This result implies that, relative to lower-fee funds, more expensive
private equity funds typically earn sufficiently higher gross returns that they offset their
higher fees.”).
119. Id. at 3 (“. . . we find some evidence that buyout funds with high carried interest
outperform, which although driven by a handful of funds, is contrary to the view that high
carried interest is excessive.”).
120. Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 2 (“We find that, as conventional wisdom and
economic theory suggest, top executive incentives are much stronger at PE-owned
companies than at comparable publicly traded companies.”).
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3-4 (stating that managers are required to contribute to equity sharing
programs through purchases of equity with their own personal funds, explained by one
interviewee in the study as a means to encourage investment into the firm by managers,
rather than as a means of compensation).

86

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

2. Reliance on Reputational Checks
Reputational constraints are a common extra-legal enforcement
mechanism and are used in a variety of settings, from corporate
governance,124 to long term contracting,125 to legislative interpretation.126 In
essence, reputational constraints are effective in settings where a party
restricts action in one setting and is aware that this action helps create a
reputation that will affect its ability to act in future situations. PPE Firms
are good examples of where those constraints should be useful. They enter
into long-term arrangements, where it is less likely that parties can account
for every eventuality over the course of the relationship.127 They are also
repeat investors. When raising funds or investing in future portfolio
companies, the counterparties will likely be aware of their conduct in
earlier transactions.128
There is also some evidence that private equity firms have altered
behavior in anticipation of avoiding reputational harm. One recent study
interviewed various participants in private equity transactions in order to
determine the rationale for their decision-making. Several participants
made the point that private equity firms tend to favor managers in their
portfolio companies due to the need to maintain a reputation for treating
managers well.129
C. Further Distance from Legal Constraints—The Attempt to Restrict
Private Litigation
The extra-legal governance devices previously described take on a new
importance in light of evidence that the trend for PPE Firms will be to
move even further away from legally binding governance mechanisms. In

124. See, e.g., Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression
Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1193 (2010) (arguing that “the minority would eschew
judicial protection only where private ordering and other market or
reputational constraints offered a reasonable substitute”).
125. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 2005, 2039-49 (1987) (examining the extralegal enforcement mechanisms that serve
to maintain cooperation over long-term contracts).
126. Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1251, 1279 (2013) (“But in the real
world, reputational constraints and repeat player phenomena would eliminate, or at least
mitigate, the risk of one-off betrayal. In a repeat player world, the availability of net benefits
for at least one political player should ultimately produce a legislative override to an
objectionable interpretation.”).
127. Scott, supra note 125, at 2039.
128. Id. at 2031-32.
129. Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 5 (“PE ﬁrms tend to favor managers when discord
arises, since it is essential to maintain a reputation for treating managers well.”).
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January 2012, The Carlyle Group, L.P., the seventh of the PPE Firms to go
public, disclosed some details about how it intended to run its business
after its IPO.130 Carlyle’s January disclosures caused a swift and uniformly
negative reaction. The New York Times’ Dealbook suggested that the
offering could be “the most shareholder-unfriendly corporate governance
structure in modern history.”131 Legal scholars questioned whether the SEC
would even allow the offering to proceed given its draconian terms.132
What was so unsettling about Carlyle’s approach? Much of their
governance structure was in line with the other public PPE Firms. Carlyle
stripped away most of the typical corporate governance provisions such as
annual shareholder voting and fiduciary duties of directors. Further, it did
not replace those provisions with traditional partnership protections such as
mandatory distributions or a pre-determined liquidation date. However, it
added one novel provision. Its partnership agreement provided that
dissatisfied investors would forego their right to sue in any state or federal
court. The agreement included a provision mandating arbitration of all
shareholder grievances, including claims for securities fraud and
shareholder oppression.
The mandatory arbitration clause caused the most uproar. Investors
questioned its desirability, and regulators questioned its enforceability.
Less than a month later, Carlyle amended its partnership agreement,
effectively withdrawing its mandatory arbitration proposal.133
The
concession was widely praised as a victory for investors and regulators, and
Carlyle’s IPO continued forward. This progress happened even though
Carlyle retained all of its other shareholder-unfriendly provisions.134
Carlyle completed its IPO on May 3, 2012, and continues to trade on the
NASDAQ.135 The governance provisions of Carlyle, while missing most of

130. See generally The Carlyle Grp., L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/15
27166/000095012312000638/w83442a2sv1za.htm#204 (disclosing the financial
information regarding the public offering of The Carlyle Group, L.P.).
131. Steven M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly IPO for Shareholders, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-anunfriendly-i-p-o-for-shareholders/.
132. See, e.g., Miles Weiss, Carlyle Seeks to Ban Shareholder Lawsuits Before Public
Offering, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0118/carlyle-seeks-to-ban-shareholder-lawsuits-before-initial-public-offering.html (describing
the legal issues regarding Carlyle’s attempt to ban shareholder lawsuits).
133. Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from IPO Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-po-plans/.
134. See generally The Carlyle Grp., L.P., supra note 130 (disclosing the financial
information regarding the public offering of The Carlyle Group L.P.).
135. The Carlyle Grp., L.P. Stock Chart, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cg/stock-chart (last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
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the protections investors have come to expect, are now in line with those of
the other six PPE Firms whose shares trade in the US.136 While Carlyle’s
mandatory arbitration provision did not become effective, the fact that
Carlyle included such a provision in its original partnership agreement
indicates that PPE Firms are moving away from law as a governance
mechanism, not toward it.
V.

QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS RAISED BY THE NEW MODEL

While Part IV describes a new governance model of PPE Firms and
provides some evidence for its effectiveness, there are many causes for
concern in implementing a regime that relies almost exclusively on extralegal devices. Part V raises a few fundamental questions and concerns,
including the degree of alignment of economic interests, the limits of
reputational constraints without a corresponding legal sanction, and the
ability of the parties to alter, and in some cases decipher, the fundamental
agreement as it currently stands. Part V concludes with a powerful,
market-driven argument in favor of current practices—the idea that
additional risks of relying on extra-legal governance mechanisms are
incorporated into the price of the PPE Firms’ public shares.
A. How Aligned are the Economic Interests?
For a system to rely so heavily on economic alignment, it is critical for
the success of the system that the incentives between the parties be
aligned.137 Two aspects of PPE Firm compensation call into question the
degree of alignment. First, insiders of PPE Firms have already achieved
great gains and have the prospect of further large payouts in the face of
modest gains or even losses to public investors. Second, managers of PPE
Firms are able to charge fees and collect distributions that may not be
subject to sharing with public investors.
The ability of key managers to receive very large annual payouts from
the firms may signify a lack of alignment with public PPE investors. For
example, each of Carlyle’s three founders received $57.6 million in
2012.138 This payout was not unusual, as the CEOs at Blackstone, Apollo,
and KKR all received significantly more.139 On the one hand, only a very
136. See generally supra Part II.
137. Steindl, supra note 7 (“The general premise . . . in the specific context of PE is: the
greater the misalignment of interest between parties, the more important effective
governance will be to their relationship.”).
138. Greg Roumeliotis, Carlyle’s founders get $57.6 million each in 2012, REUTERS
(Mar. 14, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/carlyle-foundersidUSL1N0C700I20130315.
139. See id. (stating that in 2012, Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwartzman earned $213
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small part of this payout was salary; most of it came from the founders’
ownership of Carlyle shares and investing in Carlyle funds.140 In addition,
public investors did gain in 2012. Carlyle went public on May 3, 2012,
closing at $22.05.141 Its closing price on December 31, 2012 was $26.03.142
Receiving a large return of capital from investing in a fund managed by
Carlyle, however, is not the same as collecting fee income by Carlyle’s
management entity. In other words, the Carlyle founders are receiving
income from investments made to align their interests with those of the
limited partners in its investment funds.143 These gains are not directly
shared with public investors. One portion of the manager’s compensation,
management fees, is not a gain, but rather a cost to the limited partners.
The profits-interest portion of the compensation is the one aspect of the
package that does align public investors, managers and limited partners.

million, Apollo’s Leon Black earned $180.2 million, and KKR & Co LP’s chief executives
Henry Kravis and George Roberts earned $137 and $141 million, respectively). This
Article does not address the even more complex question of the effect of such great wealth
on the incentives of executives to earn additional marginal dollars.
140. Id.
141. The
Carlyle
Group,
L.P.
Historical
Stock
Prices,
NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cg/historical (last visited Dec. 16, 2013).
142. Id.
143. For a description of the competing interests of limited partners in investment funds
and public investors in a PPE firm, see supra part I.B.
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The other concern with alignment is whether opportunities arise for
insiders to make returns to the exclusion of the public investors. One such
possibility relates to the treatment of additional charges called transaction
and management fees. These are charges that private equity firms level on
portfolio companies, and that comprise a part of their compensation over
and above the 2/20/1 system described above.144 “Transaction fees [are
sometimes referred to as deal or success fees and] are charged by the
private equity firm in connection with the completion of the acquisition for
typically unspecified advisory services.”145 “Monitoring (or management)
fees are the fees charged by a private equity firm to its portfolio company
for ongoing advisory and management services after the acquisition.”146
Dechert and Preqin did a comprehensive study of these fees in late
2011. One piece of information from that report that is of particular
interest to PPE Firms is how those fees were shared among the various
constituencies. The report found no uniformity at all, noting that:
Transaction and monitoring fees may be allocated entirely to the
general partner and/or an affiliated advisory entity of the private
equity firm, or otherwise divided between the other partners of
the private equity fund. Our survey with Preqin requested that
private equity firms indicate how such fees are allocated. Of the
72 firms that responded, approximately 36.6% of the private
equity firms provided that all or a significant portion of the fees
are divided between all of the limited partners of a private equity
fund. Approximately 43.7% of the private equity firms split the
fees evenly between the general partner and/or an affiliated
advisory entity and the limited partners. The remaining 19.7% of
the firms provide that all or a significant portion of the fees are
paid to the general partner of the private equity firm. There was
no discernable difference in the method of the allocation by the
firms between transaction fees and monitoring fees.147

144. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 23-24 (“Private equity firms take fees on a number of
bases. Most of their yield is asset (rather than profit) based. Historically, buyout firms took
asset fees of two per cent of the capital committed to the buyout funds per fund year. . . .
Private equity firms also charge carried interest. . . . Finally, the buyout fund imposes
charges on the target company. A transaction fee is charged upon both the sale and
purchase of a target. In between, the target pays an annual monitoring fee based on its
EBITDA.”).
145. Dechert LLP & Preqin, Transaction and Monitoring Fees: On the Rebound?, 6
(Nov. 2011),
http://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Dechert_Preqin_Transaction_and_Monitoring_Fees.pd
f.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Id. at 12.
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Because of this disparate treatment of both transaction and monitoring fees,
the discretion involved in the disposition of these funds creates a large
opportunity for a dis-alignment of financial incentives within PPE Firms.
B. Limited Usefulness of Reputational Constraints
Lack of faith in the ability to rely on reputational constraints creates
another area of concern, particularly where supposed reputational limits are
not backed by binding legal sanctions. This concern stems from two
sources—the abandonment of a reputational concern by private equity
firms in the recent financial crisis and the regular presence of sophisticated
investors on the other side of reputational guarantees.
1. Evidence from the Financial Crisis
Before the financial crisis, many contracts between private equity
firms and target companies contained reverse termination fees. These
provisions allowed a private equity buyer to walk away from a deal by
paying a set fee.148 Even though many contracts contained this type of
provision, it was felt that private equity buyers were unlikely to ever trigger
it because doing so would taint the image of that firm for future buyers.149
This constraint was briefly successful in stopping private equity buyers
from canceling deals to which they had earlier agreed.150
As conditions worsened in the market, however, private equity firms
were less constrained by this reputational factor and more inclined to
strictly honor their minimal legal commitments. Once the first private
equity buyer invoked a reverse termination fee, it was not shunned and its
reputation was not harmed. Instead, other buyers quickly followed suit.151
Once that extra-legal constraint was overcome, the parties rapidly adjusted
their expectations, focusing on the legally enforceable rule, rather than the
148. Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 502
(2009).
149. Id.
150. Id. (“Initially, no single private equity firm was willing to stain its reputation and
harm its competitive position in the buyout market by invoking a reverse termination fee
provision. Instead, these firms asserted MAC claims to publicly justify termination and
avoid being labeled as walking on their transactions and, thus, an untrustworthy future
acquirer. As the fall progressed, however, the reputational forces on private equity firms to
complete buyouts became diluted as the credit markets remained illiquid and the number of
terminated private equity deals increased.”).
151. Id. at 504 (“The URI-Cerberus dispute and Cerberus’s subsequent termination of
their agreement resulted in a further deterioration of the reputational force preventing the
exercise of a reverse termination fee provision. In the period from December 2007 through
February 2008, three additional private equity transactions would be effectively
terminated.”).
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unwritten, reputational addition to that rule.152 In times of distress, it seems
likely that other purely reputational constraints of PPE Firms are vulnerable
to suffering a similar fate.
2.

Significance of the Sophistication of Investors

Another concern relating to the reliance on reputational constraints is
that these extra-legal governance mechanisms require sophisticated
counterparties who can be aware of extra-legal norms, be in a position to
monitor compliance, and be able to take effective action if the norm is
ignored or otherwise dishonored. However, it is not clear that public
investors in PPE Firms possess this sophistication. Even if current
investors do, public investors are, by their nature, fluid and composed of
different types of investors.
One example where sophistication has mattered in the private equity
area relates to the setting of fees. In contrast to mutual funds, where
investors do not possess a uniform, or uniformly high, degree of
sophistication, higher mutual fund fees are strongly correlated to lower
fund performance.153 However, when a study was done of private equity
fund fees, higher fee funds actually outperformed lower fee funds, even
after taking into account the fee payment. The team conducting the study
explained that performance was a result of the higher sophistication of
private equity fund investors demanding higher performance, and those
investors being willing to identify and pay for quality.154 This difference
between performance of mutual funds and private equity funds indicates
the need for sophisticated investors to monitor extra-legal constraints.
Unfortunately, PPE investors do not uniformly possess this sophistication.

152. Id. at 505 (“[U]nderstanding of the parties in private equity agreements appeared to
have fallen by the wayside and the inherent optionality in this type of a reverse termination
fee structure was realized. Reverse termination fee provisions appeared to become
exercisable without significant reputational impact or other external normative
constraints.”).
153. Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 117, at 2 (“This pattern [of higher fee funds
producing higher gross returns] stands in striking contrast to results in the mutual fund
literature, which finds a strong negative relation between mutual fund fees and net-of-fee
performance.”).
154. See id. at 3. The data offers little support for the view that private equity
management contracts allow GPs to charge excessive compensation for the performance
they deliver. Instead, the evidence is most consistent with the alternative view that limited
partners are relatively sophisticated investors who understand the long-term nature of
private equity investments and the limited opportunities for alternative governance
mechanisms.
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C. Uncertainties of Enforcement and Application
A final concern regarding the lack of legally-binding governance
provisions is the uncertainty about a court’s willingness to enforce a PPE
Firm’s decision to remove generally applicable, corporate-style protections,
like fiduciary duty waivers, without replacing them with traditional, noncorporate style contractual limits. Larry Ribstein, a longtime advocate of
alternate governance arrangements, discusses courts’ roles in enforcing
these decisions:
There is an indication that Delaware courts are prepared to
enforce fiduciary duty waivers even in a publicly-traded firm.
The question may be a closer one if a publicly held firm
eliminates corporate-type rights without substituting the
partnership mechanisms . . . such as buyout rights or limited
terms. A firm arguably should not be able to escape scrutiny
simply by changing its name from corporation to partnership.
Rather, the lesson of this Article is that courts need to consider
the firm’s entire bundle of rights and obligations before applying
corporate restrictions on contracting.155
A closely related concern is that the broad discretion granted to the PPE
managers encompasses the unilateral ability to amend the firm’s operating
or partnership agreement,156 or to issue shares.157 Either of these
circumstances adds to the uncertainty in determining the rights and
responsibilities of parties involved in PPE Firm governance.
D. The Mediating Effect of Price
Public shareholders incur some additional risk when investing in a PPE
Firm that lacks legally-binding governance protections. However, that is
but one of the many risks that those shareholders assume. Their investment
will be subject to systemic risks relevant to the US equities market and the
financial sector, and company specific risks relating to the PPE Firm’s
business plan and the capability of its leaders. Those risks create less of a
155. Larry E. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 306 (2009).
156. Apollo Global Management, LLC, Amended and Restated Limited Liability
Company Operating Agreement, Exhibit 3.2, 16, 43-45 (July 13, 2007). The operating
agreement provides that the Manager may amend the AGM operating agreement without the
consent of any shareholders in many instances.
157. Oaktree Capital Group Operating Agreement, Amended Registration Statement
(Form S-1) 21, (Mar. 30, 2012). The Oaktree Board can issue an unlimited number of
shares at any time for any purpose on the terms that the Board determines without
shareholder approval.
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concern because observers assume that they are accounted for when setting
the price of the security.
That publicly available information is incorporated into stock prices is
a foundational principle of modern financial theory. This principle has
been accepted by courts and incorporated into the securities law
jurisprudence.158 If markets incorporate information when setting prices,
then the additional governance risk the PPE investors incur could already
be reflected in the price paid.
However, studies differ on whether and to what extent all information
is incorporated into prices. As Professor Jeff Schwartz has noted, “[f]rom a
behavioral finance perspective, information remains an accuracy-inducing
force. But because market processes are imperfect, prices remain
inaccurate, even in an information-rich environment. Thus, it makes sense
to think of disclosure as improving relative stock-price accuracy, even
though the [efficient-market hypothesis] ideal remains beyond reach.”159
There is some empirical support for this behavioral approach, particularly
when markets are required to process complex information. In a study of
market reaction to downgrades of collateralized debt obligations, Robert
Bartlett found that the information conveyed in those downgrades was not
fully processed into the market price of securities.160
The extent to which the risks of foregoing legally-binding governance
protections are incorporated into the prices of PPE Firms would be a
fruitful area of future research.
CONCLUSION
Private equity firms have already challenged the assumptions of
corporate governance with their hands-on management philosophy and
their aggressive use of equity compensation. Now, as some of the largest
of these firms issue shares to public investors, they may be creating an even
bigger problem. Evidence from the seven PPE Firms indicates that they are
rejecting legally binding governance mechanisms in favor of extralegal
incentives. They have minimized the impact of shareholder voting and
waived or removed the effectiveness of fiduciary duties. They have
omitted contractual restraints such as durational limits and mandatory
158. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure
Practice, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2006) (describing the efficient-market hypothesis of
public information being incorporated into stock prices).
159. Jeffrey Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 228
(2010).
160. See Robert P. Bartlett, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010) (examining the
effect of derivative disclosures in the financial sector).
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distributions that have long been favored by partnerships. The only
remaining governance tools are those without legal sanction, such as
alignment of economic incentives and the moderating effect of reputational
constraints. However, many reasons exist to doubt whether these tools
alone will be enough to effectively combat the agency costs found in
private equity firms.
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